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JAPAN'S NEW PATENT ATTORNEY LAW BREACHES
BARRIER BETWEEN THE "LEGAL" AND "QUASI-
LEGAL" PROFESSIONS: INTEGRITY OF JAPANESE
PATENT PRACTICE AT RISK?
Lee Roussot
Abstract: In order to increase the quantity of intellectual property related legal
services made available to the public, the Japanese Diet enacted a complete revision of
Japan's eighty-year-old Patent Attorney Law. Under the terms of the new law, which
became effective on January 6, 2001, benrishi (patent attorneys) have authority to greatly
expand their range of professional activities. The newly recognized activities encroach
upon the statutory monopoly long enjoyed by Japan's bengoshi (attorneys).
Furthermore, the new legislation gives the benrishi a professional domain that is
inconsistent with the profession's credential requirements. This Comment argues that the
revision is likely to have negative and unforeseen consequences. First, given the highly
regulated nature of Japan's professions, consumers, especially those the legislation was
intended to assist, will infer that benrishi have legal training consistent with their sphere
of authorized activities. This could put clients at a significant disadvantage in licensing
contract negotiations, arbitration proceedings and other situations where the opposite
party is represented by a bengoshi with extensive legal training. Second, benrishi will
now have significant incentive to "capture" clients and steer them away from litigation.
Conversely, bengoshi will have a new incentive to "capture" patent clients at the
application and prosecution stages of the process rather than at the licensing and
litigation stages. Given that the bengoshi can perform all levels of patent work but are
not required to have even a minimal science or engineering background, this outcome
would also put the best interests of clients at risk. Therefore, to preserve the integrity of
Japanese patent practice, the Japanese government should take steps to harmonize the
credentials of the benrishi and bengoshi professions both with each other and with
respect to the demands of the patent law regime or, in the alternative, roll back the
revision and shift the focus of reform to the bengoshi profession.
1. INTRODUCTION
Japan's 4278 benrishil (patent attorneys) practice their trade at the
intersection of law and technology. Given that Japan's intellectual property
t The author wishes to thank Mr. Shunichi Doi of the Japan Patent Office, who suggested that I
write on this topic. The author also wishes to thank professors John 0. Haley, Washington University
School of Law, St. Louis, Toshiko Takenaka, Director, Center for the Advanced Research and Study of
Intellectual Property, University of Washington School of Law, Seattle, and Veronica Taylor, Director,
Asian Law Center, University of Washington School, of Law, Seattle, for their generous assistance and
advice. Finally, the author wishes to thank the many editors at The Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal
whose patience and perseverance made this Comment possible.
' Japan Patent Office ("JPO"), Tokkyo Gydsei Nenji Hr1kokusho, [Patent Administration Annual
Report] 276 (2000) [hereinafter Report]. As of 1999, the number of benrishi totals 4278. While the term
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
regime has been the subject of dramatic reform over the past decade,2 and
that the legal system has become a priority target for future reform, 3 it
seemed inevitable that the law regulating the benrishi would be
reformulated. However, the new law does not address previously identified
problems with the benrishi system. Indeed, it seems to exacerbate them.
Furthermore, the new law is likely to create an additional set of problems
that will compromise Japanese patent practice. Finally, the new law may
actually frustrate the Japanese govemment's stated pro-patent strategy.4 It is
for these reasons that this Comment urges a reconsideration of the rules that
govern the credentials and professional domain of the benrishi.
Part II of this Comment supplies the context for evaluating both the
motivation for and the likely impact of the new law. First, because the
success or failure of the new law may depend on whether the expansion of
the professional domain of the benrishi vis A vis that of the bengoshi
(attorneys) results in greater customer choice or greater customer confusion,
the evolution and relative status of the two professions is described in some
detail. In addition, the success or failure of the new law will also depend on
the extent to which it produces results that are consistent with the policy
objectives that are driving current reform efforts in Japan. Thus, Part II
further examines the shift in Japanese patent policy and the resulting
pressures on the country's legal system. Finally, the new law must be
evaluated in terms of its effectiveness in addressing weaknesses that were
identified in the benrishi system, as it existed before January 6, 2001.
Accordingly, Part II also addresses criticisms of the old law.
Part III introduces the new Patent Attorney Law. The plain language
of the new law makes it clear that the benrishi have been granted a much
broader license than they previously enjoyed, though there is no concurrent
requirement that the benrishi receive a higher level of training than they
have in the past.
benrishi is often translated as "patent attorney," the historic role of a benrishi is much closer to that of an
American patent agent.
2 Toshiko Takenaka, Patent Infringement Damages in Japan and the United States: Will Increased
Patent Infringement Damage Awards Revive the Japanese Economy?, 2 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 309
(2000).
1 Ministry Of Int'l Trade and Industry ("MITI"), since renamed Ministry of Economy, Trade, and
Industry ("METI"), Report of Corporate Legal System Study Group for Research on Economic Activity
and the Judicial System, May 9, 2000, available at http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/ index.html
[hereinafter MITI Report]. "Drastic reform of the judicial system is urgently required." Id.
4 Benrishi-h6 [Patent Attorney Law], Law No. 49 of 2000 (effective Jan. 6, 2001), available at
http://www.ron.gr.jp/law/law/benrisi.htm. (author's trans.) [hereinafter New Patent Attorney Law]. Article
I states: "The purpose of this law is... to contribute to the development of industry and the economy by
contributing to the appropriate protection, use, and promotion of industrial property." Id.
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In Part IV the new law is analyzed with respect to the circumstances
of its beginning. This Part concludes that the new law is likely to produce
meager benefits while spawning a host of unintended consequences.
Finally, in Part V an alternative set of reforms is proposed which,
taken singly or as a group, move more directly toward achieving the goal of
upgrading the quality of intellectual property related legal services and
adjudication in Japan. Most significantly, if the Japanese are sincere in their
desire to usher in an "Era of Wisdom,"5 they should take more concrete steps
to create a corps of professionals who are deeply educated in both law and
science.
II. CONTEXTUAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Evolution of Competing Professions
One striking feature of the new Patent Attorney Law is the way it
disrupts the established hierarchy between the benrishi and bengoshi
professions. In the past, the relationship between the two professions
reflected the disparity in their relative status and prestige.6 This disparity
was institutionalized through rules controlling admission to the professions
and their relative authority in the courtroom.7 The status gap was a product
of the fact that Japan's modem legal system and its intellectual property
regime evolved independently.8 Although both have their roots in the
demands placed on Meiji Era (1868-1912) Japan,9 the two systems were
established to address different problems.
In response to the impaired national sovereignty that resulted from the
imposition of "unequal treaties" by the United States,'0 Britain, France,
5 The phrase "chie nojidar" is ubiquitous in JPO publications. See, e.g., Report, supra note 1, at
67-68.
6 Shozo Ota & Kahei Rokumoto, Issues of the Lawyer Population: Japan, 25 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 315, 329 (1993). See also Constance O'Keefe, Legal Education in Japan, 72 OR. L. REV. 1009,
1010 (1993) ("[B]engoshi occupy such an exalted position in the hierarchy of the Japanese legal world.").
New Patent Attorney Law, supra note 4. Article 7 provides that bengoshi are automatically
considered to be qualified as benrishi. Art. 5 notes that benrishi act as assistants to bengoshi. Art. 5-2
gives bengoshi the power to retract any statement or opinion uttered in court by a benrishi. Id.
' In comparison, the U.S. Constitution enables Congress to create both the court system (Article 3)
and the intellectual property system (Article 1, Section 8). U.S. CONST. arts. III, I § 8.
' For domestic purposes, the Japanese use calendars that are based on the reign of Emperors and
each reign produces a new era (jidai). The Meiji Era was followed by the Taish6 Era (1912-1926), the
Shbwa Era (1926-1989), and the Heisei Era (1989-present).
" The Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the United States and Japan (The Harris Treaty),
signed on July 29, 1858, available at http://www.fcc.sophia.ac.jp/Faculty/Devine/documents/harris.html.
The most onerous feature of the treaties was their "extraterritorial jurisdiction" provisions, which called for
foreigners committing crimes in Japan to be tried in courts established by the treaty partners and subject to
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Holland, and Russia in the late 1850s, Japan established Western style legal
institutions." By comparison, Japan's patent system was the product,
though not an immediate one, of the effort to erase the technological deficit
that remained in the wake of 26512 years of military rule under Ieyasu
Tokugawa and his descendants. 3 The bakufu (military government) was so
hostile to innovation that in 1721 the shrgun Ieyasu Yoshimune declared a
"prohibition of novelty."' 4 The bakufu also attempted, with mixed success,
to impose a policy of complete national isolation.' 5 The combination of
isolationism and hostility to innovation had the effect of leaving Japan with
a severe technological deficit relative to the United States and Europe. This
deficit was exposed by the arrival of Commodore Perry's "Black Ships"' 6
from the United States in 1853 and, eventually, the display of Western
military power at the Shimonoseki Strait in 1864." As a result, the 1868
Meiji Restoration 8 signaled not just a change in government but a change in
technology policy as well. Specifically, the Meiji Emperor's Imperial
Charter Oath' 9 declared that "[k]nowledge shall be sought for throughout the
the laws of those partners. The other four nations obtained substantially identical terms. For a general
discussion of the treaties, see KENNETH B. PYLE, THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN 63-66 (2d ed. 1996).
1 See, e.g., Judicial Reform Council, The Points at Issue in the Judicial Reform, Dec. 21, 1999,
available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/ foreign/judiciary/0620reform.html. "[T]he coordination of modem
codes of law and judicial systems were indispensable for Japan in order to amend unfair treaties .... Id.
12 1603 to 1868. Tokugawa's military success ended a particularly violent period in Japanese
history, referred to as the "Warring States Period," and effectively unified most of the territory that makes
up contemporary Japan (excepting the northern island of Hokkaido). For a general discussion of
Tokugawa era policies, see PYLE, supra note 10 at I 1-57.
"3 Japan Patent Attorneys Ass'n, History of Patent Attorneys, available at
www.jpaa.or.jp/english/pa/3-9/index.html. "[T]he Edo (Tokugawa) Period suppressed imagination and
creativity by making it a crime." Id.
'4 Id. The sh5gun was alarmed by a trend toward luxury. However, the ban extended to all new
products. Violators were guilty of treason. Id.
"s PYLE, supra note 10, at 16. The closed country (sakoku) policy was aimed at depriving disloyal
regional lords of the military advantages they would reap from contact with Westem vessels. The policy
was also intended to stop the flow of Christianity, a destabilizing force, into Japan. Id.
16 TESSA MORRIS-SuZuKi, THE TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION OF JAPAN FROM THE
SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 61-62 (1994). The American ships were the first steam-
powered vessels the Japanese had ever seen. Id.
"7 JOHN WHITNEY HALL, JAPAN FROM PREHISTORY To MODERN TIMES 260 (1968). The
Shimonoseki Strait is the shipping lane between the islands of Honshu and Kyushu. Marine traffic from
the East China Sea to Tokyo must pass through the strait or take a much longer, less protected route. The
diamy5 (local military lords) in the Satsuma and ChbshOi regions had never been fully loyal to the
Tokugawa government and advocated a military response to Western encroachment. Their attacks on the
British navy were not authorized by the Tokugawa regime. Id.
s The 1868 change in govemment is referred to as a Restoration because the previously displaced
Imperial government was reinstated after centuries of obscurity. For a general discussion of the early
history of the Imperial line, see HALL, supra note 17, at 24-74.
"9 The Imperial Charter Oath was not a constitution per se. However, until a constitution wa
promulgated on February I1, 1889, it was the most authoritative statement of the new government's
VOL. 10 No. 3
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world so as to strengthen the foundations of Imperial rule" and that "[e]vil
customs of the past shall be broken off and everything based upon the just
laws of Nature."2  To that end, an expedition including more than one
hundred of Japan's leading citizens was dispatched on a two-year fact
finding tour of the United States and Europe. 21 However, while Western
technology and legal institutions were imported simultaneously, the
industrial exploitation of that technology occurred independent of any
contribution by or interference from the legal system.
2
1. The Creation of a Legal Profession: Bengoshi
Japan's modem judicial system, based primarily on the French model,
was established in 1872.23 By 1876 the Ministry of Justice had created
standards, largely ineffective, regarding who could represent litigants in
court.24  Regulation of the profession was formalized with Japan's first
Bengoshi H5 (Lawyers Law) in 1893.25 The Chinese characters (kanji) used
in the title of the profession suggest that bengoshi are involved in the work
of defense or exculpation.26 The early professionals were held in low
esteem, especially when compared with their modem day counterparts who
are revered as the cream of Japan's meritocracy.27 The structure of the
profession was significantly altered during the Occupation Era (1945-
1952).28 The most significant change was that legal education was
founding principles. Imperial Charter Oath, available at http://www.fcc.sophia.ac.jp/Faculty/
Devine/documents/charter.html.
20 Id.
2' PYLE supra note 10, at 85. The expedition was the famed "Iwakura Mission," led by Prince
lwakura Tomomi.
22 Ota & Rokumoto, supra note 6, at 316-17.
23 PYLE, supra note 10, at 79, 417, 419 (1991).
24 Linda A. Cooper, Is the Door Half Open or Half Shut? Japan's Special Measures Law
Concerning the Handling of Legal Business by Foreign Lawyers, 18 N. Ky. L. REV 417,419 (1991).
25 Bengoshi-h6 [Lawyers Law], Law No. 7 of 1893 (Japan).
26 For example, entries 2004 (ben), 1648 (go), and 3405 (shi) in NTC'S NEW JAPANESE-ENGLISH
CHARACTER DICTIONARY (Jack Halpem ed., 1990) yield the senses of "speak eloquently," "protect," and
"professional suffix." By comparison, the middle character of benrishi, entry 970 (ri), is used to convey
"reason" or a "basic principle." The study of ri, (i.e., rigaku,) is the study of science, usually the physical
sciences.
27 Gino Dal Pont, The Social Status of the Legal Professions in Japan and The United States: A
Structural and Cultural Analysis, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 291, 293, 296, 301 (1995). In Japan, "merit"
is often synonymous with test taking prowess. See also JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW
43 (1998). "In this environment, merit tends to be defined in terms of performance on examinations."
Thus, the difficulty of the entrance exam and the current high status of the profession are mutually
reinforcing factors. "[T]he status of attorneys recently ascended to that of high prestige ... largely due to
the tremendous difficulty of the examination itself." Dal Pont, supra at 301.
" Dal Pont, supra note 27, at 297.
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nationalized through the establishment of the Judicial Training and Research
Institute, since renamed the National Legal Research and Training Institute
("LRTI").2 9 Additionally, much of the control of the profession was shifted
from the Ministry of Justice to a private organization, the Japanese
Federation of Bar Associations ("JFBA"),30 also known as Nichibenren. The
JFBA, not surprisingly, considers the suppression of competition to be
among its most important functions. 3' For example, the JFBA waged a
decades long campaign to limit the access of foreign attorneys to the
Japanese market. 32  While the Foreign Lawyers Law33 was eventually
enacted, JFBA lobbying ensured that it would be highly restrictive.34
The bengoshi monopoly on the practice of law is guaranteed by
Chapter X of the Lawyers Law of 1949.35 Under the heading of
"[p]rohibition of practice of law by person who is not a lawyer," Article 72
states:
No person other than a lawyer shall, with the aim of obtaining
compensation, perform the legal business such as presentation
of legal opinion, representation, mediation or conciliation, and
the like in connection with lawsuits, non-contentious matters,
suchas application filed with the administrative office as request
for review, raising of objection, or request for investigation,
etc., and other general legal cases, or act as an agent therefor.
Provided that this shall not apply to such cases as otherwise
provided for in this Law.36
29 id.
30 Id. at 298.
"' Jason Comrie-Taylor, The "Appropriate" Role for Foreign Trainees in Japan, 15 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 323, 326 (1997) ("Bengoshi feel entitled to expect a monopoly over legal services."). For a
detailed analysis of the contours of the bengoshi cartel and its economic consequences, see generally J.
Mark Ramseyer, Lawyers, Foreign Lawyers, and Lawyer-Substitutes: The Market for Regulation in Japan,
27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 499 (1986). Conversely, the JFBA contends that exclusivity is necessary to avoid a
repeat of the problems caused by an oversupply of bengoshi in the 1920s. Dal Pont, supra note 27, at 299,
307.
32 Ramseyer, supra note 31, at 503.
" Gaikoku bengoshi ni yoru h6ritsu jimu no toriatsukai ni kansuru tokubetsu s6chih6 [Special law
Concerning the Handling of Legal Business by Foreign Lawyers], Law No. 66 of 1986 (Japan).
3' Ramseyer, supra note 3 1, at 504.
33 Bengoshi-h6 [Lawyers Law], Law of 205 of 1949 (Japan), translated in EIBUN-HOREISHA, 6 EHS
LAW BULLETIN SERIES 2040 [hereinafter Lawyers Law].
3'6 Id. art. 72.
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This clause has been the basis for the distinction between the "legal" and
"quasi-legal" professions." In practice the phrase "in connection with
lawsuits" has meant that bengoshi have sole authorization to represent
parties in adversarial proceedings.38 Conversely, quasi-legals, such as
benrishi, zeirishi (tax attorneys), and notaries act as intermediaries between
friendly private parties or between private parties and the Japanese
government. For example, this structure differentiates between the legal
services of negotiating contracts (adversarial, bengoshi required) and
drafting them (bengoshi not required).39
Entrance to the profession is also tightly regulated.4" Bengoshi are
generally survivors of at least two tiers of brutally competitive testing:
college entrance exams and the shih3 shiken, i.e. the entrance exam for the
National Legal Research and Training Institute ("LRTI").4' Most bengoshi
are graduates of undergraduate law programs at first tier universities, which
administer highly competitive admissions tests.42 While the undergraduate
years themselves are traditionally a relatively carefree interlude before
young Japanese become "society people," those with aspirations to become
bengoshi fully commit their lives to preparing for yet another bruising exam,
the shih5 shiken.4  Most years the number of test takers exceeds the
available openings at the LRTI by a ratio of greater than fifty to one. 4 While
" Comrie-Taylor, supra note 31, at 332. The quasi-legal professions include benrishi (patent
attorneys), zeirishi (tax attorneys), judicial scriveners, public accountants, administrative scriveners, and
notaries. See Ota & Rokumoto, supra note 6, at 323-28. Some scholars prefer the term "adjacent
professions." See, e.g., Veronica L. Taylor, Re-regulating Japanese Transactions: The Competition Law
Dimension, (unpublished manuscript, on file with The University of Washington Pacific Rim Law &
Policy Journal).
38 Ramseyer, supra note 31, n.3(b), discussing the scope of Article 72. See also Comrie-Taylor,
supra note 31, at 332 (refuting the argument that negotiation and other tasks not related to litigation are
outside the scope of Article 72). This sole authorization applies as between bengoshi and other
professionals, which means it does not prevent a party from acting pro se. Ramseyer, supra note 31, at
517. Also, the language of Article 72 would allow a non-bengoshi to represent another person if it were
not for the purpose of obtaining compensation.
9 Ramseyer, supra note 31, at 539 n.3(b).
4 Id. at 507. Ramseyer describes the regulations as "Draconian." Id.
41 HALEY, supra note 27, at 43-44.
4 Id. at 42.
41 Id. at 41-42. In fact, preparing for the examination is so time consuming that many law
undergraduates do not bother to attend class. Instead they study at full time at specialized cram schools
(juku). See also Setsuo Miyazawa & Hiroshi Otsuka, Legal Education and the Reproduction of the Elite in
Japan, I ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 2, 27 (2000) ("They had spent their time totally in their cram
schools.").
" The "pass" rate on the shihd shiken is strictly a function of the number of test takers and the
number of available seats. Therefore, the low percentage of people who "pass" does not necessarily mean
that the test is difficult, only that it is competitive. See Ota & Rokumoto, supra note 6, at 318 (noting that
while the test is ostensibly a qualifying examination, in practice it serves as an "eliminative" exam).
MAY 2001
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
many Tokyo University students pass on their first attempt,45 the successful
applicant is, on average, a twenty-nine year old making his sixth attempt.46
Those who squeeze through this narrow entrance to the profession receive
two years of practical legal training at the LRTI and paychecks from the
Japanese government.4 7 Given the expectation that a bengoshi will have an
undergraduate degree in law,48 very few have significant training in the hard
sciences."
2. The Creation of a Quasi-legal Profession. Benrishi
The importation of technology and the rapid industrialization of Meiji
Japan occurred without a significant contribution from Japan's fledgling
legal institutions.50 By the mid-1880s, however, Japan had absorbed the
available Western technology5' and was able to initiate a program of
promoting homegrown inventors. 2 The first Patent Ordinance, which
recognized only the patent rights of Japanese inventors, was passed in
1885."3 In 1899 Japan acceded to the Paris Convention on Industrial
Property54 and passed a Patent Law (Tokkyo H6) that recognized the rights
of foreign applicants.5 At the same time, Japan's first regulations aimed at
benrishi, the Patent Agent Registration Regulations, were given effect. 6 Six
years later, Japan imported, as intact as possible, the German patent
system.5 ' The Patent Attorney Law58 was enacted in 1921 and has survived
with only minor amendments until this year's complete revision. Prior to
45 HALEY, supra note 27, at 44.
' Ota & Rokumoto, supra note 6, at 318.41 Id. at 319.
48 HALEY, supra note 27, at 41.
4' Takenaka, supra note 2, at 368. Japanese universities do not have double degree programs. The
choice between law and science is therefore an either/or proposition. Interview with Veronica L. Taylor,
Director, Asian Law Center at the University of Washington, in Seattle, Wash. (Apr. 10, 2001).
o Ota & Rokumoto, supra note 6, at 317.
5' To accomplish this, Japan employed a small army of foreign technical experts. MORRIS-SUZUKI,
supra note 16, at 79 tbl. 4.1.
52 HISAMITSU ARAI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICIES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE
JAPANESE EXPERIENCE IN WEALTH CREATION 19 (1999).
53 Japan Patent Attorneys Ass'n, supra note 13.
' Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 13 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S.
4931.
55 Japan Patent Attorneys Ass'n, supra note 13.
56 Id.
57 Id.
"' Benrishi-h6 [Patent Attorney Law], Law No. 100 of 1921 (Japan), translated in Eibun-Hrreisha, 6
EHS LAW BULLETIN SERIES [hereinafter 1921 Patent Attorney Law].
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January 6, 2001, the domain of the benrishi was defined by Article 1 of the
Patent Attorney Law:
A patent attorney may, with respect to patents, utility models,
designs, trademarks, or international applications act as an
agent in matters to be done before the Patent Office, and in
matters to be done before the Minister of International Trade
and Industry concerning motion for objection or decisions in
relation to patents, utility models, designs or trade marks, or
international application, and render expert opinion on the
matters as well as conduct any other business services relating
thereto as his business.5 9
Further, from Article 9, paragraph 2:
A patent attorney may, in regard to litigation under the
provisions of Article 178 paragraph 1 of the Patent Law, Article
47 paragraph 1 of the Utility Model Law, Article 59 paragraph
1 of the Design Law or Article 63 paragraph 1 of the Trade
Mark Law, act as an advocate.60
However, the "litigation" provided for by Article 9, paragraph 2
extends only to cases where the Commissioner of the Japan Patent Office
("JPO") is the defendant, i.e. appeals of rejected applications.61
As with bengoshi, aspiring benrishi must survive the ordeal of an
examination with a very low "pass''62 rate (4.9% in 1999).63 The test
includes a mandatory short answer section on Industrial Property Law and
an essay section where the applicant chooses three out of forty-one available
topics.64 The average age of those who pass the test is thirty-four years.65
Only about one benrishi in seven has a background in law.66
s9 Id. art. 1.
60 Id. art. 9 para. 2. To act as an advocate in this context is to have less than full representational
authority. This is because the client or his bengoshi may immediately revoke or correct a statement made
in court by the benrishi.
61 See, e.g., Tokkyo h6 [Patent law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 178, para. I (Japan).
62 In contrast to the shih5 shiken with its predetermined pass rate, the benrishi exam can, in theory,
be passed by an unlimited number of persons each year. Future reform of the test is aimed at increasing
the number of successful examinees, while simultaneously reducing the average age of those who are
successful. See Report, supra note 1, at 68.
63 id.
64 Benrishi-h6 Shik5rei, [Patent Attorney Law Enforcement Ordinance], Imperial Ordinance No.
466, Dec. 15, 1921, ch. I [hereinafter Patent Attorney Law Enforcement Ordinance].
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One important difference between the entrance requirements of the
two professions is that for bengoshi the examination is the gateway to
further training whereas for the benrishi it is the gateway to the profession
itself. Furthermore, Article 7 of the new Patent Attorney Law exempts
bengoshi from the licensing requirements, i.e., bengoshi are presumed to be
qualified to act as benrishi.67  There is no reciprocal right granted to
benrishi.6' A similar exemption from the benrishi test is granted to patent
examiners from the JPO with seven or more years of experience.69
B. A New Era of Reform?
The new Patent Attorney Law is but a small chapter in the larger story
of ongoing Japanese efforts to reform outdated institutions and regain the
competitive edge the country enjoyed in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
Indeed, not since the Meiji Era has Japan been forced to subject its
institutions to such intense scrutiny. For this reason, the success or failure of
the new law is directly tied to the extent to which it advances or hinders the
reform agenda.
1. Japan's Patent Practice Turned Upside Down
While Japan has long had the institutional framework, e.g., the JPO,
necessary for an effective system of patent protection, until quite recently
inventors, both foreign and domestic, were sharply disadvantaged in relation
to parties wishing to appropriate patented technology.7°
For most of the postwar period, foreign inventors could claim with
considerable justification that the patent system had been co-opted by
Japanese industry and, consequently, emptied of its integrity.7' The most
notorious example of the Japanese patent system being used as a tool of
abuse against a foreign inventor was the Kilby Patent.72 Kilby, an employee
63 Report, supra note 1, at 68.
' Thirty-one out of211 new benrishi in 1999. Japan Patent Attorneys Association, supra note 13.
67 New Patent Attorney Law, supra note 4, art. 7. This exemption was incorporated in the 1921
Patent Attorney Law, supra note 58, art. 3, para. 1. As of 2000, approximately 300 bengoshi had cross-
registered as benrishi. See Report, supra note 1, at 68.
6' Lawyers Law, supra note 35, art. 10.
69 New Patent Attorney Law, supra note 4, art. 7. This exemption was incorporated in the 1921
Patent Attorney Law, supra note 58, art. 3, para. 2.
'0 John C. Lindgren & Craig J. Yudell, Protecting American Intellectual Property in Japan, 10
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. I, 6 (1994).
"' Id. at 7.
72 Id.
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of Texas Instruments, invented the integrated circuit in 1958.7 ' The
Japanese patent on the invention was filed on February 6, 1960, but,
incredibly, the actual grant of the patent occurred over twenty-nine years
later, on October 30, 1989. 74 In addition to procurement difficulties, foreign
patent holders faced a slew of obstacles in their efforts to enforce valid
patents. These obstacles included extremely narrow interpretation of patent
claims, 75 the absence of discovery procedures, 76 and limits placed on the
amount of damages that could be recovered through successful litigation.77
The barriers faced by foreign inventors were in addition to those
frequently faced by their Japanese counterparts. For example, Japan's pre-
grant opposition procedures were easily abused.7" Similarly, the practice of
"patent flooding" could impair the efforts of both foreign and domestic
owners of patent rights.79
As long as Japan's economy continued to hum, criticism of the patent
system, particularly that of foreign origin, was likely to fall on deaf ears. In
fact, in the 1980s, Japanese business leaders often ridiculed American efforts
to protect industrial property rights in Japan.8 0 The American preoccupation
with patent rights was seen as symptomatic of its failure in the arena of
global manufacturing.8 ' At that time, of course, the soaring Japanese
economy was the envy of the world while that of the United States was
dismissed as a "hollowed" shell of its former self.
The 1990s saw a dramatic turnaround in Japanese attitudes regarding
the need for vigorous legal protection of industrial property. First, as
Japan's economy slumped, protecting its trade surplus with the United States
73 Id.
74 Id.
"' Id. at 27. See also Stephen Lesavich, The New Japan-U.S. Patent Agreements: Will They Really
Protect U.S. Patent Interests in Japan?, 14 WIs. INT'L L.J. 155, 169 (1995).
76 Nancy J. Linck & John E. Mcgarry, Patent Procurement and Enforcement in Japan-A Trade
Barrier, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 411, 422 (1994).
77 Id.
7' M. Brendan Chatham, The Impact of the "Technology Transfer Surplus" on the Trade Deficit
With Japan and its Cures, 25 GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 561, 579 (1996). Japan allowed competitors the
opportunity to challenge a patent before it was issued. By using this technique, they could delay the
issuance of the patent while developing their own competing products. Id.
79 Jeffrey A. Wolfson, Patent Flooding in the Japanese Patent Office: Methods for Reducing Patent
Flooding and Obtaining Effective Patent Protection, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L. L. & ECON. 531, 531
(1994). Patent flooding was the practice of filing a large number of patents with very small improvements
over a competitor's technology. This would prevent the original inventor from exploiting the invention
unless he was willing to cross-license with the patent flooder. Id.
" Lindgren & Yudell, supra note 70, at 13 (quoting Norichika, "our competitiveness is not
threatened as long as American companies' attention is on income from intellectual property rights and not
from manufacturing profits").
81 Id.
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became an absolute necessity. 2  That, in turn, gave the United States
government leverage in its demands that Japan upgrade its intellectual
property regime.83 This leverage bore fruit in the form of a Letter of
Agreement between the two nations, dated August 16, 1994, that promised
reform on both sides, though much more was demanded of Japan.84 While
this demonstration of gaiatsu85 was quite effective, it was not the only cause
of Japan's about face on patent policy. Of equal importance was the fact
that as Japanese companies moved more of their manufacturing offshore,
particularly to Southeast Asia, the Japanese found themselves in a position
analogous to that of the United States relative to Japan in previous decades.
In other words, Japan went from being an importer to being an exporter of
technology.86 Thus, the shift to a pro-patent policy was also consonant with
Japan's changing economic interests. This conclusion has been reinforced
by pronouncements that the future health of Japan's economy is predicated
upon the creation and protection of intellectual property.
87
The change in Japan's intellectual property regime has been
impressive. Patent Divisions have been established in the Osaka and Tokyo
District courts.88 The patent examination process has been completely
overhauled.89 The courts have shown a new willingness to broadly interpret
patent claims9" and impose significant damage awards.91
One possible bottleneck that could compromise the effectiveness of
this newly invigorated system would be the lack of qualified professionals to
tend to its operation. Thus, the new Patent Attorney Law can be seen as a
small, final step in a long, generally successful, process. The question then
82 Id.at9-10.
93 Id.
" Agreement Between Ronald Brown and Takakazu Kuriyama of the Japanese Embassy, Aug. 16,
1994, available at http://www.okuyama.com/94agree.html.
85 The word gaiatsu is formed by combining the characters that convey the meanings of "outside"
and "pressure." See NTC's NEW JAPANESE-ENGLISH CHARACTER DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at entries
186 and 2970. It is generally used as a term of derision against outside meddling, particularly American, in
Japan's internal affairs.
86 MORRIS-SUZUKI, supra note 16, at 293. For a general discussion of Japan's economic penetration
into Asia, see WALTER HATCH & KozO YAMAMURA, ASIA IN JAPAN'S EMBRACE (1996).
87 Wolfson, supra note 79, at 555, discussing the need to promote small companies, many of which
have intellectual property as their only asset. See also ARAI, supra note 52, at 18-19.
8 Minsoh6 [Code of Civil Procedure], Law No. 109 of 1996, art. 6 (Japan).
89 Agreement, supra note 84. As promised, Japan ended the practice of pre-grant opposition and
reduced the period for demanding an examination from seven to three years. Law No. 68 of 1996 and Law
No. 51 of 1999, amending the Patent Law, supra note 61.
" Toshiko Takenaka, Harmonizing the Japanese Patent System With Its U.S. Counterpart Through
Judge-made Law: Interaction Between Japanese and U.S. Case Law Developments, 7 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'Y J. 249, 249 (1998).
9' Takenaka, supra note 2, at 311.
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becomes whether the new law will serve as the capstone to the endeavor or,
conversely, will prove to be the weak link in an otherwise impressive chain.
2. The Japanese Legal System is a Ripe Target for Reformers
While the transformation of Japan's intellectual property regime is
nearly complete, the legal system appears to be at the beginning of its own
cycle of regeneration. As with the patent system, the Japanese legal system
has been cited as a trade barrier by Japan's trading partners.92 However,
domestic criticism has also been very pointed. For example, a "white paper"
published by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI")
concluded that "the current judicial system is incapable of adequately
supporting the activities of enterprises," and, consequently, is a candidate for
"drastic reform." 93 Given MITI's status within the Japanese government and
the uncharacteristic bluntness of the language, one can only conclude that
serious reform will, in fact, take place. 94
The agenda for legal reform is being formulated by the Judicial
Reform Council ("JRC").95 While the contours of the system that will
ultimately emerge from the JRC's deliberations are far from clear at this
point, an examination of the "Points at Issue"96 offers insight into the
motivation behind the new Patent Attorney Law. For example, there is the
anticipation that the number of cases requiring professional knowledge of
intellectual property rights will increase sharply.97  Other items under
consideration include the need for increased access to legal professionals
and the need to re-evaluate the relationships between lawyers and the quasi-
legal professions.98 The entire legal education system is also subject to
reconsideration.99
On November 20, 2000, the JRC issued its Interim Report.' The
report indicates that Japan may go as far as dismantling the LRTI and
creating a system whereby graduate schools become the primary vehicle for
92 Comrie-Taylor, supra note 31, at 338. See also Ramseyer, supra note 31, at 499.
13 MITI White Paper, supra note 3.
' Miyazawa & Otsuka, supra note 43, at 14 (discussing prevalence of Tokyo University Graduates
at MITI, itself an indication of institutional prestige).
" The creation of the JRC was enabled by Shih6 Seido Kaikaku Shingikai Sechih6 [Law
Establishing Judicial Reform Council], Law No. 68 of 1999 (Japan).
Judicial Reform Council, supra note 11.
9 Id. at 5.
s Id. at 10.
SId. at 11.
'o Interim Report, available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/report/naka-houkoku.html.
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legal education. ° ' Regardless of the final form that legal education takes in
Japan, it should be obvious that the institution has reached a point of rare
fluidity.
10 2
The significance of the ongoing reforms on the new Patent Attorney
Law is twofold. First, it has been suggested that the broadening of the
benrishi domain was a pragmatic concession: the alternative was that the
profession would be drowned by the flood of bengoshi, soon to be 3000 a
year, pouring out of the LRTI or its equivalent.'0 3 More importantly, the
state of institutional flux means that there are few constraints on how the
benrishi profession could be structured. In other words, the Japanese have
the unique opportunity to posit exactly what the benrishi credential should
be, and then work backwards from that definition to create an educational
structure that will produce professionals of the highest caliber.
C. Criticism of the Benrishi System Prior to January 6, 2001
Even if the new Patent Attorney Law could be shown to be consistent
with the goals of the aforementioned reforms, the question of whether the
new law addresses previously identified problems with the benrishi system
would still be an important one. In particular, outside observers have
complained that the benrishi, as a group, lack the scientific and technical
training that the profession demands. 1°" This lack of training manifests itself
in poorly written patents. 105
Another basis for criticism has been that the benrishi are not effective
advocates for their clients.'0 6 Foreign applicants have found, for example,
that benrishi typically provide services limited to the translation and filing of
a patent application. 7 Beyond that, however, the foreign applicants have
not been able to count on benrishi to vigorously pursue the patent.10 8 This is
101 Id.
" The range of possibilities was indicated in part by the variety of topics discussed at a recent
symposium on Japanese Legal Education. The 4th Japanese Law Online: International Symposium "Legal
Education in the 21st Century," Victoria, British Columbia, Apr. 4, 2001. Papers from this symposium
will be available on-line in the near future.
103 Interview with Professor Veronica Taylor, supra note 49. Professor Taylor raised this as only one
of many possible explanations for the new law.
"o4 Lindgren & Yudell, supra note 70, at 20.
105 Id.
" Chatham, supra note 78, at 587.
107 id.
108 Id.
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apparently due to the tendency of benrishi to defer to the judgment of JPO
examiners.'0 9
It could be argued that these criticisms are rooted not in the benrishi
system itself but, rather, in the ethno-centric expectations of outsiders not
well versed in Japanese patent practice."' However, since the new Patent
Attorney Law is part of a larger effort to internationalize the Japanese legal
system, the new law should, in fact, protect the expectations of interested
parties outside Japan.
III. THE NEW PATENT ATTORNEY LAW
Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the new Patent Attorney Law regulate the
professional activities of the benrishi profession from the date of January 6,
2001.
Article 4. Benrishi may, at the request of another person, act as
a representative with respect to proceedings before the JPO
regarding patents, utility models, designs, trademarks,
international applications, and international registration
applications; and also with respect to opposition proceedings
and appeals before the Ministry of Economy and Industry
regarding patents, utility models, designs and trademarks, and
may also offer expert opinions and conduct other business
related to these matters.
(2) Benrishi may, at the request of another person, and in
addition to the business described in the preceding section,
conduct the following business activities as part of their
profession. (a) They may act as agents in proceedings in front
of the Director of Customs as described in Article 21, paragraph
4, of the Custom Rates (tariff) Law (Showa year 43, Law no.
54), as well as those regulated by Article 21-2, paragraph 1, of
the same law which are conducted by the Director of Customs
or the Ministry of Finance. (b) They may act as representatives
at arbitration proceedings regarding patents, utility models,
designs, trademarks, and certain types of unfair competition.
These arbitration proceeding are limited to groups recognized
and appointed by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
109 Id.
11' Lesavich, supra note 75, at 158-59, 161.
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("METI"). The ability to act as representative extends to
settlement proceedings on the matter that is subject to
arbitration.
(3) Benrishi may, in addition to the business described in the
previous two sections, while using the title "benrishi," and at
the request of another person, consult, mediate, or act as a
representative regarding licensing, the sale of rights or other
contract pertaining to patents, utility models, designs,
trademarks, circuit layouts, and copyrights (material regulated
under Article 2, section 1, number 1, of the Copyright Law
(Showa year 45, Law no. 48)). However, this does not extend
to matters where the conduct of business is limited by other
laws.
Article 5. In courtroom proceedings regarding patents, utility
models, designs, trademarks, international applications,
international registration applications, circuit layouts, and
certain unfair competitions, benrishi may while acting as an
assistant appear with the concerned party or the trial
representative (bengoshi) and ask questions or make statements.
(2) Regarding the questions or statements referred to in the
previous section, they will be regarded as having been made by
the concerned party or the trial representative. However, the
concerned party or trial representative may, without delay,
withdraw or correct the statement made by the benrishi.
Article 6. Benrishi may act as trial representative in litigation
governed by Article 178, section 1 of the Patent Law (Showa
year 34, Law no. 121), Article 47, section 1 of the Utility Model
Law (Showa year 34, Law no. 123), Article 59, section 1 of the
Design Law (Showa year 34, Law no. 125), and Article 63,
section 1 of the Trademark Law.
The most salient feature of the new law is that it strikes a one-sided
bargain: the benrishi receive a professional windfall in terms of their
expanded domain but are not required to earn the benefit by, for example,
meeting more rigorous licensing standards. In other words, rather than
creating a regime where the standard work is done by a greater number of
benrishi, the law will have essentially the opposite effect, i.e., benrishi with
the same qualifications as before will be performing a variety of previously
forbidden tasks.
VOL. 10 No. 3
JAPAN'S NEW PATENTA7TORNEY LA W
First, benrishi may act as representatives with regard to proceedings
before the Ministry of Customs to prevent the importation of infringing
products into Japan."' Because benrishi at these proceedings are appearing
before a body that did not previously recognize them, and will be arguing
that competitors are infringing on their clients' rights rather than merely
asserting the validity of those rights, this added duty puts benrishi squarely
in the realm of adversarial proceedings. Second, with respect to industrial
property,"2 circuit layouts, '1 3 copyrighted material, and technical secrets,
benrishi may offer consulting services and act as representatives or
mediators for licensing and sales contracts." 4 Notably, copyright, which is
administered through the Ministry of Culture, is not classified as industrial
property in Japan.' 5 Thus, this paragraph also broadens both the range of
jurisdiction and the range of acceptable activities for the profession.
Third, with respect to industrial property, circuit layouts, copyrighted
material, and certain types of unfair competition," 6 benrishi may act as
representatives in settlement and mediation as well as certain arbitration
proceedings conducted under the auspices of bodies recognized by the
Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry. 1 7  Because these proceedings
feature adverse parties and issues of infringement, the benrishi's
representative role embodies a significant expansion of the professional
domain. Additionally, the possibility of allowing benrishi to represent
clients in the actual litigation of infringement cases is still under
consideration. 18
Finally, the NPAL eliminates nationality and domicile
requirements." 9 In a related move, the Japan Patent Attorney Association
has lifted restrictions on advertising by benrishi.20
... New Patent Attorney Law, supra note 4, art. 4, para. 2(a).
12 "Industrial property" encompasses patents, utility models, designs, and trademarks. Japan Patent
Office, Outline Of Industrial Property System, available at http://www.jpo.go.jp.
"' As defined by Hand6tai Shfiseki Kairo No Kairo Haichi Ni Kanseru Hrritsu [Law Regarding the
Circuit Arrangement of Semi-Conductor Circuits], Law No. 43 of 1985 (Japan).
"4 New Patent Attorney Law, supra note 4, art. 4, para. 3.
' Japan Patent Office, supra note 1. See also Copyright Research Infor. Ctr. (visited Jan. 3, 2001),
http://www.cric.or.jp/circe/index.html.
16 As defined by art. 2, paras. 1.5-1.9 of Fusei Kybs6 Bbshi H6 [Unfair Competition Prevention
Law], Law No. 47 of 1993 (Japan).
... New Patent Attorney Law, supra note 4, art. 4, para. 2(b).
... Report, supra note 1, at 68.
.. The nationality and domicile requirements were previously codified in Law No. 100 of 1921 at
art. 2(1). With the restrictions lifted, benrishi may now work for overseas subsidiaries or Japanese
corporations or otherwise conduct business outside of Japan. This is consistent with the goal of
internationalizing the benrishi profession.
120 Report, supra note 1, at 69. The lifting of advertising restrictions is consonant with the JPO's
stated objective of extending patent services to a broader population.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW PATENT ATTORNEY LAW
The new law invites a skeptical response on many levels. First and
foremost, does the law adequately serve the underlying policy objectives that
are driving institutional reform in Japan? Generally speaking, using the
American model as the yardstick to measure Japanese institutions does a
disservice to the discussion. However, since much of the literature in
support of the new law identifies the United States as the exemplar for patent
practice, it is fair to ask if the new law, taken in combination with reforms to
both the intellectual property regime and the judicial system, goes far
enough in ensuring that work so vital to Japan's future is entrusted to
capable hands. It is also fair to ask if the order of action, i.e., expanding the
professional domain first and visiting the issue of qualifications later,
unfairly shifts the risk of inadequate representation to consumers. By
reversing the order, the Japanese could have made benrishi bear the risk that
if they did not meet tough new credential requirements, they would have to
forgo the new economic opportunities that have been bestowed upon the
profession. This would seem to be a more ethical way of allocating risk.
Finally, consideration must be given to the fact that in a vertically ordered
society such a Japan, there might be a considerable advantage to channeling
reform "down" through the bengoshi rather than "up" through the benrishi.
A. The New Law Does Not Upgrade the Benrishi Credential to Match the
Expanded Professional Domain
The section of the Patent Administration Annual Report that
introduces the new Patent Attorney Law features the heading, "cultivating
talent in the 'era of wisdom.""" Yet the law itself does not demonstrate any
commitment to "cultivate talent," i.e., improve the system of selecting and
educating benrishi'2 This omission seriously undermines the likelihood
that the new law will produce net benefits.
1. The Intersection of Law and Technology
Though meteorologists doubt its veracity, the phrase "every cloud has
a silver lining" has enduring appeal. Applied to Japan, the cloud is the "lost
,...'chie nojidai'ni okerujinzai ikusei." Report, supra note 1, at 68.SNew Patent Attorney Law, supra note 4, arts. 9-15.
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decade" of the 1990s. The silver lining is that the Japanese have exceptional
freedom to shape their institutions to suit their needs. The parallels to the
Meiji Era are readily apparent: international competition has exposed the
vulnerability of Japan's fossilized institutions and, in response, the Japanese
are looking to their competitors for solutions. The question can then be
asked as if for the first time: "What should a benrishi know?" Law?
Science? Both? Neither? If the answer is other than "neither," should
candidates be required to demonstrate their mastery of the subject matter
before they begin representing clients in situations where a lack of
competence could destroy a small business? These are policy questions with
answers that depend on what is at stake at this point in Japan's history. The
evidence suggests that fortifying the intellectual property system is high on
the list of Japan's national priorities. Japan's Ministry of International Trade
and Industry ("MITI"), the parent agency of the JPO, has reached the
conclusion that the United State's pro-patent policy provided the impetus for
its strong recovery from the recession plagued 1980s.'23 In a similar vein, a
Yomiuri Shinbun article introducing the new Patent Attorney Law begins by
observing that "it is anticipated that a violent international competition will
develop in the area of manufacturing with industrial property rights as its
weapons." '24 Noting Japan's trade deficit in technology, as measured in
patent licensing fees, the article continues, "unless the base of the industrial
property system is strengthened, Japan will not be able to fight."' 25 Putting
aside the question of whether strengthening the industrial property system
will, in fact, revive its moribund economy, the Japanese have chosen to
identify this as a priority item on the national agenda. The new Patent
Attorney Law should reflect that choice.
In spite of the fact that an ideal benrishi system would recognize the
importance of integrating law and science, the current system places
surprisingly few educational burdens on its participants. For example, there
is no requirement that an aspiring benrishi have a science degree or, for that
matter, any science or engineering background at all.'26 The benrishi test
itself is also problematic.'27 For example, a candidate could choose to be
' Takenaka, supra note 2, at 309. MITI is now known as METI, supra note 3
124 Benrishi-h6 No Kaisei Ha Okina Zenshin [The Revision of the Patent Attorney Law is a Big
Advance], Apr. 16, 2000, available at http://www.morimoto-sr.ac/deloffice/2000/04/16.html (translated by
author).
125 Id.
126 Patent Attorney Law Enforcement Ordinance, supra note 64, ch. 1.
27 Id. The first stage of the test requires that the applicant choose from several possible answers to
questions concerning laws and regulations related to industrial property (patents, utility models, designs,
and trademarks), treaties related to industrial property, and laws and regulations related to the conduct of
benrishi business. Only applicants who pass the multiple choice stage are allowed to move on to the essay
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tested only in the subjects of Constitutional Law, Surveying Methods, and
Science of Fisheries.' Expertise in these fields, though conceivably useful,
is rarely implicated in actual patent work. The fact that only about four
percent of the applicants make it through the various stages of the test does
not in itself lead to the conclusion that the test is an effective vehicle for
selecting benrishi. If the criticism of the quality of Japanese patents is valid,
the inference would be that the test is difficult, but difficult in the wrong
way. By comparison, Germany, historically the model for Japanese patent
practice, requires that prospective patent attorneys have a degree in an
industrially important science, have experience as an apprentice in industrial
property law, and pass a test administered by the German Patent Office.'29
By way of further comparison, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office's ("USPTO") guidelines mandate that candidates for the Patent Bar
must have a Bachelor of Science degree or the equivalent in one of thirty-
one technical subjects or be able to pass a Fundamentals of Engineering (FE)
test. 130 The comparison to the United States is especially significant in light
of the fact that "the patent attorney's work is open to fierce international
competition."' 131 Furthermore, the American competition for the benrishi is
not American benrishi, i.e., patent agents, but rather the 16,000 Americans
who are described by the JPO as tokkyo bengoshi, i.e., patent bengoshi.'12
These are professionals who have passed both the Patent Bar, with its
requirement of a significant science background, and a state bar exam that
follows three years of law school. Some American law schools are also
designing curricula that allow students to seek joint degrees in law and
science or engineering. 3 3 Thus, the credential gap argued here is not just
exams. The essay exam covers rules and regulations related to industrial property. Additionally, the
applicant chooses to be tested on subjects included in a list formulated by the Ministry of Economics,
Trade and Industry. Finally, applicants who are successful on the essay exam move on to an oral
examination on laws and regulations related to industrial property. Revision of the test is still on the
agenda. However, this Comment contends that the change should have been made in the test and other
qualifying procedures before the expansion of the professional domain.
28 Other test topics of questionable value for the purpose of screening benrishi include Criminal
Code, Code of Criminal Procedure, and Economics. Id.
'29 N. Thane Bauz, Reanimating U.S. Patent Reexamination: Recommendations For Change Based
Upon a Comparative Study of German Law, 27 CREIGHTON L. REv. 945, 970 n. 156 (1994).
"' United States Patent and Trademark Office, General Requirements Bulletin For Admission To The
Examination For Registration To Practice In Patent Cases Before The United States Patent And
Trademark Office, at 3-6, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/ offices/dcom/olia/oed/index.html.
131 ARAI, supra note 52, at 95.
132 Report, supra note 1, at 68.
33 Toshiko Takenaka, Law School Education in the New Business and Technology Era, p.7, paper
presented at the 4th Japanese Law Online: International Symposium "Legal Education in the 21st
Century," at Victoria, B.C. (Apr. 4, 2001).
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between the benrishi and the hypothetical ideal patent professional, the gap
also exists in the harsh arena of global economics.
2. A Poorly Negotiated Bargain
One frequently discussed feature of intellectual property systems is
the bargain struck between, for example, an inventor and society. In
exchange for divulging a new and useful technology the inventor receives
monopoly rights to exploit the technology for a prescribed period.'34 A
similar knowledge/monopoly swap occurs in regards to the professions.'35
In exchange for demonstrating a certain level of education and training,
professionals receive protection from various forms of competition.'36 An
underlying premise of this bargain is that the burden of attaining the
credential and value of the monopoly are calibrated to each other. In fact,
negotiating this bargain is arguably the raison d'itre of professional
associations.'37  In general the knowledge/monopoly arrangement is
economically efficient because the monopoly rents captured by the
professionals are more than offset by the savings realized by consumers who
would otherwise be forced to investigate the history of every doctor, dentist,
lawyer, etc., whom they employed. This arrangement also serves to allocate
risk in a way that is socially acceptable. For example, consider an
unregulated society where the only prerequisite to practicing surgery is
possession of a reasonably sharp scalpel. By imposing a
knowledge/monopoly framework, society can shift risk between the parties
by reducing the risk that the patient will be the victim of a incompetent
surgeon and by increasing the risk that someone who wishes to practice
surgery will be unable to do so. Of course, if the burden is shifted too
aggressively, society can regulate itself into a shortage of professionals.
This, incidentally, describes the state of the bengoshi profession in Japan. 3 '
Many Japanese appear in court pro se. 139 At the same time, thousands of
other Japanese invest massive resources of both time and money into failed
efforts to win seats at the LRTI.
40
"4 ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 2 (1999).
' Eliot Friedson, The Theory of Professions: State of the Art, in SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS
19, 24 (Robert Dingwall & Philip Lewis eds., 1983).
136 id.
137 Id.
131 MITI Report, supra note 3 (discussing shortage of legal professionals).
3 Ramseyer, supra note 31, at 517.
'40 Id. at 524.
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To deregulate a profession is to rewrite the knowledge/monopoly
contract between that profession and the society it serves. And the benrishi
may, in fact, be an appropriate target for deregulation.141 However, the final
configuration of the contract must protect the reasonable expectations of
those parties who rely on the bargain. This statement would apply with even
greater force when the act of deregulation puts the regulated professionals
into contact with inexperienced, more vulnerable consumers, as is the case
with the new Patent Attorney Law.'42 The inquiry then becomes twofold.
First, what education and training would a first time purchaser of benrishi
services expect the benrishi to have? Second, does the law ensure that
benrishi will, in fact, have the qualifications that are expected of them?
There are at least two situations where the answer to the second question is
likely to be negative: international licensing negotiations and arbitrations
before the Arbitration Center for Industrial Policy ("ACIP").
a. Representation in international licensing negotiations
According to Richard H. Lilley, Jr., an international licensing
specialist, a practitioner making licensing arrangements in Japan would be
faced with a thicket of legal issues: Tax Law, Foreign Exchange and Foreign
Trade Control Law, Anti-Monopoly Law, Fair Trade Commission
Guidelines, Civil Procedure and Patent Law. 143 Unquestionably, Contract
Law could be added to this list. Even a well-trained, experienced legal
professional would find the synthesis of all the relevant law to be a daunting
task. It follows that a benrishi, with only a very narrow field of legal
expertise, would be at a disadvantage in this setting. Yet, a client who has
hired a benrishi is likely to rely on the knowledge/monopoly bargain and
assume that benrishi are qualified to do what benrishi are permitted to do.
Two other facts bear mentioning in the context of negotiating
international licensing agreements. The first is that these negotiations are
quite often adversarial in nature.'" This is because negotiations are often
141 MITI Report, supra note 3 (noting the need for high level expertise as globalization progresses
and disputes regarding intellectual property increase).
142 See, e.g., Report, supra note I, at 71-73 (describing efforts to bring the industrial property system
into contact with the general public). See also Wolfson, supra note 79, at 556 (noting MITI's commitment
to nurturing small, entrepreneurial enterprises).
14' Richard H. Lilley, Jr., Licensing in Japan: Current Issues 1997, available at
http://www.okuyama.com/licensel.html. (At the time Mr. Lilley, Jr., wrote this article, he was Chairman
of the International Consequences of Licensing Subcommittee of the American Intellectual Property Law
Association). These areas of law are listed in the table of contents and discussed extensively in the article.
144 Id. at Part VII(E).
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opened only after one party has accused the other of infringement. 45 If the
negotiation is in regard to a dispute that has ripened into litigation, then it is
"in connection with a lawsuit," and, therefore, falls within the traditional
frame of the bengoshi monopoly. 146 The other is that while much of the
increase in licensing will be between Japanese companies and their
subsidiaries in Southeast Asia, reducing the licensing deficit with the United
States remains a priority. Consequently, benrishi will often be pitted against
American attorneys who have a greater depth of training in both legal and
scientific matters. 47
b. Arbitration proceedings before the A CIP
The other activity where the gap between what the benrishi are
allowed to do and what they are qualified to do appears to be unacceptably
wide is the representation of clients in arbitration proceedings before the
ACIP. This is because arbitration proceedings are nearly as adversarial as
actual litigation.'48 It follows, therefore, that arbitration proceedings demand
a higher level of "lawyering" than required for patent prosecution.
Admittedly, it is hard to predict whether arbitrations will become a
high volume business for the benrishi. While settlement of lawsuits is the
norm in Japan, the practice of arbitration has never extended its roots very
deeply. 49 Two Japanese arbitration centers, The Commercial Arbitration
Center and The Maritime Arbitration Center, have failed to attract much
business. 5° Conversely, there are indications that the ACIP may fare better
than those institutions. The Judicial Reform Council has identified the
establishment of an alternate dispute resolution mechanism as a priority
issue. 5' Furthermore, some commentators believe that intellectual property
disputes are uniquely well suited for arbitration.1 2  While the use of the
"' Shoichi Okuyama, Patent Infringement Litigation in Japan, available at
http://www.okuyama.com (1997). Mr. Okuyama is a benrishi.
" See Ramseyer, supra note 37, and accompanying text.
"47 See supra Part IV.A.I. and discussion therein. See also Arai, supra note 52, at 58 (noting
competitive advantage that American attorneys with science backgrounds enjoy over their Japanese
counterparts).
... Julia A. Martin, Arbitrating in the Alps Rather than Litigating in Los Angeles: The Advantages of
International Intellectual Property Specific Alternative Dispute Resolution, 49 STAN. L. REV. 917, 960
(1997) ("[A]rbitration is viewed with the same distaste as litigation given its similarly confrontational
nature").
' 9 WORLD ARB & MEDIATION REP. 290 (Nov. 1998).
1so Id.
" Points At Issue in the Judicial Reform, supra note 11.
152 Martin, supra note 148, at 923-25. However, some scholars have reached the opposite
conclusion. Interview with Professor Veronica L. Taylor, supra note 49.
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ACIP has thus far been limited to disputes over internet domain names,
ACIP's literature makes it clear that it intends to create a facility for the
rapid, fair, and confidential resolution of disputes for the entire field of
industrial property.'53
Broader factors also suggest that the ACIP will be a success. For
example, recent changes in Japanese patent practice, such as the drift toward
recognition of infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents'54 and the
move toward allowing larger damage awards in infringement cases, 55 are
certain to increase the number of patent disputes which, in turn, should
create opportunities to arbitrate.
56
The likelihood that benrishi will obtain a significant share of the
arbitration business is increased by the fact that, compared to the United
States, lawsuits in Japan are more developed at the time of filing.
57
Japanese government support for expanded alternative dispute resolution, an
increasingly contentious patent landscape, and the extent to which the actual
initiation of litigation can be delayed, are all factors that point to the
possibility that arbitration will prove to be a professional bonanza for the
benrishi.
B. The New Patent Attorney Law Carelessly Upsets the Balance Between
Professions
Prior to January 6, 2001, the relationship between the benrishi and the
bengoshi featured a vertical hierarchy between the two and clearly
demarcated spheres of activity. The vertical hierarchy, with bengoshi in the
upper position, was reinforced by the exemption granted bengoshi who
wished to also register as benrishi,'58 the fact that benrishi had a subordinate
role when included in litigation teams,'59 and the fact that a bengoshi could
withdraw any statement or opinion uttered in court by a benrishi on his
team.' 61 It was also well established practice that a benrishi would complete
and file patent applications and act further only in response to rejections
handed down by the JPO.161  Once a valid patent was obtained, any
' See generally Arbitration Ctr. For Indus. Policy, at http://www.ip-adr.gr.jp.
154 Takenaka, supra note 90.
"' Takenaka, supra note 2.
156 Id. at 368.
' James A. Forstner, Patent Litigation in Japan, China, and Korea, 366 PLI/PAT 13, 17 (1993).
'58 Patent Attorney Law, supra note 58, art. 3, para. 1.
' Id. art. 9.
160 Id.
161 Chatham, supra note 78, at 587. See also Lesavich, supra note 75, at 180.
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controversy that arose with regard to a third party would fall into the domain
of the bengoshi.1
62
While disrupting the relationship between the two professions is not
per se a bad idea, if done, it should be done with care. Consideration should
be given to the fact that a new structure creates a new set of incentives. No
less important is the challenge of ensuring that the new arrangement protects
the interests and expectations of consumers. Finally, it may be advantageous
to use the structure of the relationship between the two professions as a
template for reform.
One possible consequence, surely unintended, of the new Patent
Attorney Law is that it may embolden other quasi-legal professions to
demand "me-too" expansions of their domains. Once again, this is not per
se a bad idea, but it does raise the same implementation concerns that have
accompanied the new Patent Attorney Law.
1. Benrishi and Bengoshi: From Complement to Collision?
The relationship between the bengoshi and the quasi-legal professions
is one of the issue items identified by the Judicial Reform Council.'63 The
new Patent Attorney Law represents the first serious attempt to change one
of those relationships and, as such, could set the tone for future deregulation
of the professions. However, it is far from assured that the new relationship
will be better than the old one, either from the perspective of society or that
of the professions themselves.
a. Competition is good-except when it isn 't
The main underlying premise of deregulation is that it unleashes
competitive forces that have been unwisely or unfairly suppressed."M Once
unleashed, though, those forces can behave in unpredictable ways.
In this case, the underlying premise is that competition between the
benrishi and bengoshi will create efficiencies that result in net gains for
consumers, in the form of lower prices (reduced monopoly rents), and
benrishi, in the form of greater business opportunities. Ironically, the end
result may be that the benrishi have incited a competition that they cannot
win. This is because instead of having complementary incentives as they did
62 Patent Attorney Law, supra note 58, art. 1.
63 The Points at Issue in the Judicial Reform, supra note 11.
" Ronald Dore, Japan's Reform Debate: Patriotic Concern or Class Interest? Or Both?, 25
JOURNAL OF JAPANESE STUDIES 65, 75 (Winter 1999).
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before January 6, 2001, the two professions now have incentives that are
diametrically opposed to each other: the benrishi have an incentive to
capture clients and hold them as long as possible while bengoshi, obviously,
have the counter incentive to intercept clients at the application stage. This
incentive structure exposes the possibly insoluble dilemma facing the
benrishi profession. The dilemma is that while the new law may have been
framed to make the benrishi more prosperous through competition, to the
extent that their business grows, the bengoshi will face increased
competition from bengoshi who take advantage of the fact that they can
register as benrishi at any time. 165 Economists recognize this as the principle
that in an unregulated market competition will drive profits to zero. 166
Furthermore, the superior prestige of the bengoshi may give them such a
competitive advantage that if the market for intellectual property related
services booms, their exemption could prove to be of far greater tactical
advantage to them than the new Patent Attorney Law is to the benrishi. At
the end of the day, then, the benrishi may find themselves to be victims of
their own success.
b. More confusion for consumers
In spite of its faults, the system in place prior to January 6, 2001, had
the advantage of clarity. Benrishi handled applications and bengoshi
handled disputes. 167  Under the new arrangement, though, consumers,
especially those new consumers the law is supposed to help, have difficult
choices to make. Worse yet, they may have to choose from two less than
ideal alternatives.
As previously noted, consumers tend to assume that the holder of a
professional credential has earned her protected market and, further, that
there is a substantial relationship between the contours of the market
protection and the prerequisites for the license. Therefore, a consumer who
is faced with the option of hiring either a benrishi or a bengoshi would
justifiably, but wrongly, assume that they had interchangeable backgrounds.
Of equal concern is the fact that a party with a highly technical product to
protect would want representation by a professional who is equally
proficient in the realms of both law and science. Japan has not yet taken
steps to ensure that such professionals exist.
65 New Patent Attorney Law, supra note 4, art. 7, para. 3.
166 JOHN B. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 243-53 (2d. ed. 1998).
167 Patent Attorney Law, supra note 58, art. 1; Lawyers Law, supra note 35, art. 72.
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c. Taking advantage of Japan's vertical society
Social scientists have long used the term "tate shakai," or vertical
society, to describe Japan's social structure. 16' This means that while Japan
does not have significant stratification along wealth and class lines, there is a
constant awareness of relative rank and status. 169 As between benrishi and
bengoshi, there is no question that bengoshi have the much higher status. 7 °
This flows from the fact that achievement in education, as measured by high
scores on entrance exams, is universally accepted as a legitimate
measurement of "merit."'' Many bengoshi have excelled on Japan's two
most hallowed exams, those that open the doors to Tokyo University and the
National Legal Research and Training Institute. 7 ' Thus, even a bengoshi
who is not especially successful in his trade can expect to be addressed by
the respectful title of sensei.173 Benrishi, on the other hand, enjoy no such
cachet. The bengoshi's superiority over the benrishi exists not just in the
public imagination; it permeates the law itself.
174
In the context of this vertical relationship, the new Patent Attorney
Law can be seen as taking the lid off the benrishi and allowing them to
expand their domain in an upward direction. However, it may be
advantageous to exploit the existing social structure by shifting the locus of
reform to the bengoshi profession and extending its reach down. In other
words, rather giving benrishi greater leeway in the legal arena, the priority
should be increasing the number of bengoshi who understand the science of
the cases that they are working on.'75 This approach has two advantages
over that embodied in the new Patent Attorney Law. First, directing reform
to the more prestigious of the two professions would ensure that the hybrid
professional that emerges is a science bengoshi rather than a legal benrishi.
This would confirm the seriousness of Japan's commitment to a pro-patent
strategy. Furthermore, with the United States identified as the competition,
' Andrew M. Pardieck, Virtuous Ways and Beautiful Customs: The Role of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Japan, 11 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 31, 34 (1997). "The idea of tate shakai, or vertical
society, permeates all interactions among the Japanese." The theory was introduced in CHIE NAKANE,
JAPANESE SOCIETY (1970).
'6 ROBERT CHRISTOPHER, THE JAPANESE MIND 141-42 (1983).
'7 Constance O'Keefe, Legal Education in Japan, 72 OR. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (1993). Professor
O'Keefe notes they occupy "an exalted position in the hierarchy of the legal world." See also Ota &
Rokumoto, supra note 6, at 329.
17 HALEY, supra note 27, at 43.
172 Id.
173 Dal Pont, supra note 27, at 293.
"7 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
175 ARAI, supra note 52, at 58 (noting superior performance of attorneys with science background).
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focusing reform on the bengoshi would lead to the emergence of tokkyo
bengoshi with qualifications equal to their American counterparts.
2. The New Patent Attorney Law May Lead to Destructive Competition
Between the Quasi-legal Professions
The professional domain of the benrishi has both vertical and
horizontal dimensions. The vertical, of course, is with respect to bengoshi.
The horizontal dimension refers to the lines of demarcation that separate the
respective spheres of activity for the various quasi-legal professions. The
recalculation of the bengoshi/benrishi equation may have the secondary
effect of triggering turf wars among the quasi-legal groups themselves.
The best indicator of storm clouds on the horizon is the reaction of the
gy5sei shoshi (administrative scriveners) to the new law. The comments
from a recent meeting organized by the Osaka branch of the scriveners
association shows that they are concerned that they will lose business to the
benrishi 7 6  This turn of events is described as "unacceptable."'
177
Furthermore, the gy5sei shoshi assert that they, too, are qualified to be
industrial property specialists. 78 That they will seek expanded powers is
made clear by the statement that, "[at] present, as our country is gathering
pro-patent policies that prioritize intellectual property, it can be said that
administrative scriveners have a chance to expand their range to include new
duties. '179 The report concludes by stating that the group's agenda includes
"creating the status of intellectual property specialist."' 8°
There is no way to predict how the battle brewing between the
benrishi and the gy5sei shoshi will finally be resolved. The key point is that
the new Patent Attorney Law may have opened a Pandora's box that will
complicate the process of legal reform. A more careful targeting of reform
would have spared the Japanese from what promises to be a noisy quarrel.
V. PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVES TO THE NEW PATENT ATTORNEY LAW
Intellectual property law can be extremely difficult. Many patents, for
example, cover the latest advances in biotechnology. Anyone who has taken
176 Comments of Osaka Branch of the Scriveners Ass'n, available at http://www.ss7.inet.
osaka.or.jp/-mjimusho/chitekikensyu.htm.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
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a class in patent law knows that students who understand science are also
more likely to grasp the interplay between law and science. Additionally,
the stakes in patent disputes can be enormous.181 Patents are also the basis
for significant international competition. 182 Consequently, Japan has a
strong interest in making sure that its patent professionals are on par with the
best in the world. Unfortunately, by expanding the benrishi domain before
upgrading the benrishi credential, Japan may have compromised its own best
interests.
Reform of the legal education system will eventually touch the
benrishi. For example, one proposal under consideration would have them
trained as graduate students. I"3 The test itself will also be revised to, among
other things, lower the average age of new benrishi.'84 The fact that reform
is on the way seems to concede the premise of this Comment, i.e., that the
current system is deficient.
Knowing that the current system's days are numbered, the suggestions
below are general in nature. The goal is to create a structure that is
consistent with the needs of all parties involved, including the professionals,
their clients, and Japan itself. It should be noted that certain reforms cannot
be recommended. For example, given the disparity in the level of prestige
attached to each profession, it would not be practical to simply fold the
benrishi into the domain of the bengoshi without requiring significant legal
training on the part of the former. Bengoshi, who have endured Japan's
worst "examination hell," would simply not tolerate the opening of a back
door to their jealously guarded profession. Nor would it be practical to
expect current benrishi to obtain a complete legal education through the
existing channel: very few of them would get past the LRTI entrance
examination.
A. Turn Back the Clock
While it may not be the most likely outcome, the return of benrishi to
their pre-NPAL status would, if accompanied by other systemic reforms, be
the simplest way to correct extant problems that were exacerbated by the
... Arai, supra note 52, at 46.
812 Id. at 44-45.
" Kunihiro Nakata, Shiritsu Daigaku Ni Okeru H6ka Daigakuin: Hitotsu No Keesu Sutadi Toshite
Ryukoku Daigaku No Arikata [Law Studies Graduate School at a Private University: Ryukoku
University's Program as One Case Study... ] presented at the 4th Japanese Law Online: Int'l Symposium
"Legal Education in the 21st Century," at Victoria, B.C. (Apr. 4, 2001).
'"' MITI, Benrishi-h5 No Gaiyd [Outline of the Patent Attorney Law], available at
http://www.jpo.go.jp.
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new law. In other words, persons possessing the minimum qualifications of
benrishi would have their activities strictly limited to preparing patent
applications and representing those applications before the PTO. This step,
when combined with an overhaul of the benrishi examination as discussed
below, would leave Japan with a corps of benrishi with well defined
functions and highly credible qualifications.
B. Create an Enhanced Benrishi Credential
Benrishi who wish to represent clients in commercial or adversarial
settings should be required to obtain appropriate legal training. This training
could be offered in a variety of settings including the JPAA's existing
training center. A candidate who has completed the course work and passed
a rigorous examination would receive authorization to perform all the duties
allowed under the NPAL. Additionally, this enhanced benrishi credential
would allow for the representation of clients in actual litigation of industrial
property related lawsuits. The creation of this second tier would allow
benrishi who are satisfied with their current activities to continue to do them
while at the same time providing an incentive for those who seek a broader
profession.
C. Eliminate the Bengoshi Exemption
The fact that bengoshi can be recognized as benrishi by simply
registering with the JPAA is indicative of the status disparity between the
two professions. To an outside observer this exemption seems
indefensible. There is nothing in the system that produces bengoshi that
would lead one to infer any scientific knowledge on their part. Therefore,
this exemption should be eliminated. Bengoshi who wish to hold a dual
qualification should be required to demonstrate a certain depth of scientific
knowledge along with a working knowledge of industrial property law. This
could be accomplished by offering them a test similar to the benrishi
examination, though the criteria for "passing" could be calibrated
differently.
' Patent Attorney Law, supra note 58, art. 8, para. 3
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D. Revise the Examination
As previously noted, a candidate personalizes the benrishi test by
choosing which subjects to challenge. 8 6 Many of the options are not related
to commercially important technology.187 A better test would pare down the
options available and at the same time require the candidate to show more
expertise in each of the subjects. Furthermore, under the current system the
law portion of the test is offered in the relatively easy multiple choice
format. Given the increasingly legal nature of the work authorized by
statute, the test should demand extensive legal knowledge. Ideally, the
examination should be structured as a counterbalance to the candidate's
undergraduate education: an individual with an undergraduate law degree
would face a more stringent science test and, conversely, a qualified scientist
would face a more difficult law section.
E. Reserve Seats at LRTIfor Scientists.
The optimal solution, which could be implemented in conjunction
with items A-D, would be to shift the focus of reform to the bengoshi side of
the equation. In other words, rather than allowing greater leeway for
benrishi to enter the legal arena, the goal should be to increase the number of
bengoshi with training in the sciences that are most important to the
intellectual property system. This could be accomplished in concert with
reforms that are already in the planning or implementation stages in Japan.
For example, the number of students admitted to the LRTI has been
gradually increased from five hundred in the 1980s to two thousand today.
That number will probably be increased to three thousand in the near
future. 88 This expansion gives Japan an excellent opportunity to improve
both the quantity and the quality of legal services offered to parties with an
interest in intellectual property by funneling qualified scientists into the legal
education system.
For example, ten percent of the seats at the LRTI could be set aside
for scientists. The expectation is that these scientists would be at a
disadvantage in the entrance competition when compared with graduates of
elite law programs. Therefore, the scientists' tests would be graded
separately. The "pass" rate for the scientists would vary based upon the
186 id.
87 id. para. I.
"' Judicial Reform Council's Interim Report on the Judicial Reform (Nov. 20, 2000), available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/ report/nakahoukoku.html.
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number of applicants and could be different than the "pass" rate for the
general pool of applicants.
At the LRTI itself, it would be relatively easy to fashion an
"Intellectual Property Track" for the scientists who win admission. This is
because the LRTI program emphasizes practical training over classroom
instruction. Accordingly, the LRTI could develop a relatively short though,
presumably, rigorous intellectual property curriculum. The practical training
could also be altered for the scientists. For example, instead of taking
assignments at the various district courts, the scientists would be assigned to
the patent division of the Tokyo High Court. Similarly, the scientists would
receive their law office training at firms with significant intellectual property
practices. Finally, of course, to receive the full credential, scientists would
sit for the JPO examination which itself has been revised to make it a more
accurate gauge of each applicant's useful knowledge.
This proposal may face opposition. An "affirmative action" program
of this kind flies in the face of the deep-seated Japanese commitment to a
meritocracy. Yet a student who has devoted many years to the study of
biochemistry or electrical engineering cannot be expected to compete for
entrance to the LTRI on equal terms with a student who has devoted a
lifetime to preparation for the shih shiken. However, since a national
consensus has already been reached regarding the importance of promoting
and protecting intellectual property, it should not be difficult to reach a
necessary secondary consensus, i.e., that the national interest is best served
by adopting a slightly broader definition of "merit," at least to the extent that
the definition governs admission to the LRTI.
It should be noted that the continued existence of the LRTI as the sole
gateway to the legal profession is in doubt.'89 However, an affirmative
action program for scientists could be molded to fit whatever institutional
arrangement succeeds the LRTI.
VI. CONCLUSION
The past decade has seen a dramatic shift in Japanese attitudes toward
the legal protection of industrial property. In the 1980s, many Japanese
businessmen ridiculed their American counterparts for their aggressive
attempts to enforce their patents. A preoccupation with patents was seen as
"89 Id. For an analysis in English of the Interim Report, see Noriko Kawawa, Judicial Reform
Council's Interim Report on the Judicial Reform, paper presented at the 4th Japanese Law Online: Int'l
Symposium "Legal Education in the 21st Century," at Victoria, B.C., (Apr. 4, 2001).
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a loser's response to superior manufacturing competition. However, with
Japan's economic malaise entering its second decade and with Japanese
businesses seeking protection from copycats in newly industrializing Asian
nations, the Japanese are now betting that a "pro-patent" strategy will help
the economy regain its previous luster. Consequently, given the importance
of patent practice to Japan's future prospects, more care should have been
taken in revising the Patent Attorney Law. To expand the range of
benrishi's permissible activities without revising the profession's entrance
standards is to put the interests of inventors and SMEs at risk. Rather, the
change in credentials should have preceded the expansion of the
professional domain. Better yet, the nexus of reform should have been
located in the more prestigious bengoshi profession. Furthermore, by
breaching the barrier that separated bengoshi, a legal profession, from
benrishi, a quasi-legal one, the Japanese have injected a new element of
uncertainty into the legal system. With both groups occupying much of the
same turf, a scramble for competitive advantage seems inevitable.
Consumers, meanwhile, will often be left to choose between two deficient
alternatives. Against this background of uncertainty, this Comment
recommends a relatively inexpensive, easily implemented, set of reforms to
protect the reasonable expectations of inventors and enterprises, foreign and
domestic, who wish to protect their intellectual property in Japan.
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